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Inadequate Implementation of EEC Directives: 
A Roadblock on the Way to 1992? 
David Anderson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC), an-
nounced in the Treaty of Rome their determination "to lay the foundations of 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."1 They equipped the Coun-
cil and the Commission of the EEC with two principal legislative tools for this 
purpose: the regulation and the directive. 
The stronger of the two tools is the regulation, which is stated in Article 189 
of the Treaty of Rome to be of general application, binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. Repeated decisions of the European 
Court of Justice (the Court) have confirmed that regulations assume the force 
of law without the need for implementing measures to be taken in the Member 
States ("direct applicability"),2 and that regulations once issued may afford 
legally enforceable rights to those concerned by them ("direct effect").3 
The directive is both less powerful and less straightforward than the regula-
tion. In the words of Article 189: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result 
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave 
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." These words alone 
* M.A. (Oxon.), B.A. (Cantab.), of the Middle Temple, Barrister. This article was written during a 
five-month attachment to the Commission of The European Communities in Brussels, but the views 
it expresses are my own. I am grateful to Laurence Gormley, Grant Lawrence and David Vaughan, 
Q.c. for their valuable comments on an earlier draft, and to Michel Ayral, Ernesto Previdi and 
Amedee Turner M.E.P. 
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3, Preamble [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. 
2 See, e.g., Case 34173, Variola Spa v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 981. 
3 See, e.g., Case 83178, Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2347, 2 
Common Mkt. L.R. 697 (1978). A provision is not directly effective purely by virtue of its inclusion 
in a regulation. It must still meet the requirements of clarity, precision and unconditionality common 
to all directly effective provisions: Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
1337, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 347 (1974). The distinction between direct applicability and direct effect 
was first made by Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in 
Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 425 (1972) [hereinafter Winter]. See also Steiner, Direct 
Applicability in EEC Law: A Chameleon Concept 2 L.Q. REV. 229-48 (1982). 
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reveal two potential weaknesses of the directive. First, Article 189 imposes only 
an "obligation of result" on the Member States, leaving them with discretion as 
to the manner in which the directive is to be implemented. Second, the directive 
is not stated to bind anyone other than the Member States to which it is 
addressed. This leaves open the important question of whether a directive can 
be binding on a non-public body such as a private individual or corporation. 
Despite the relative weakness of the directive as a legislative tool, there are 
significant fields of EEC activity in which the Treaty of Rome permits only 
directives to be used. These fields include the right of establishment (Articles 
54, 56), freedom to provide services (Article 63(2)), liberalization of capital 
movements (Articles 69, 70) and the approximation of laws (Article 100).4 
Regulations were excluded from these fields, no doubt, because the original 
Member States were wary of giving too much legislative power to the institutions 
of the Community. Yet directives may in many cases be more suitable instru-
ments for the co-ordination of policy. Creative use of their duty to implement 
directives can enable national Parliaments to find neater, more flexible and less 
controversial means of legislative change than would be afforded by the im-
position of a directly applicable regulation. 
The effectiveness of the directive as an instrument for major policy change 
is currently being tested as never before. In June 1985, at the prompting of the 
European Council,s the Commission issued a White Paper containing over three 
hundred specific proposals for completing the internal Community market by 
December 31, 1992.6 The aim of this program is to make a reality of the 'four 
freedoms' enshrined in the Treaty of Rome: free movement of goods (Articles 
9-37), free movement of persons (Articles 48-58), freedom to provide services 
(Articles 59-66) and free circulation of capital (Articles 67-73).7 
The implementation of the internal market program should in theory be 
facilitated by the new Single European Act, which came into force on July 1, 
1987 and incorporates the first major amendments to the founding treaties of 
4 Article 100A of the Treaty of Rome provides for measures other than directives to be used for 
the approximation of national provisions having as their object the establishing and functioning of 
the internal market. This must be read subject to the Declaration on Article 100A which was adopted 
by the Member States in February 1986: "In its proposals pursuant to Article 100A(I) the Commission 
shall give precedence to the use of the instrument of a directive if harmonization involves the amend-
ment of legislative provisions in one or more Member States." See Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at 
art. 100A. See also infra note 10. 
S The European Council is the name given to the heads of state or government of the member 
states when they meet at their regular summits. The European Council may function as the Council 
provided for in the Treaties, but was given its own official status by Article 2 of the Single European 
Act. See 51 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1.83 (4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAws OF ENGLAND]. 
6 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 
final. 
7 Some of these "freedoms" can be subdivided. See P. MATHljSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW (4th ed. 1985). 
1988] INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EEC DIRECTIVES 93 
the EEC.8 The amended Treaty of Rome now provides for the establishment 
of the internal market by 1992 (Article 8A).g It aims to facilitate the adoption 
of internal market measures by a major extension of majority voting in the 
Council (Article 100A).!O Extensive advertising campaigns, notably in France, 
have attempted to alert the citizens of the EEC to the imminence of "1992" and 
to the possibilities of a "Europe without frontiers." 
The plan is a highly ambitious one, envisaging an internal market which is 
larger and in some respects even more integrated than that of the United 
States." The political risks are high, because lack of progress in anyone of a 
8 A full and generally hopeful appraisal of the Single European Act as it affects the internal market 
is given by Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
361 (1987). For a more negative view see Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the Single European Act, 
24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1987). 
y Article 8A states: 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal 
market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article and of Articles 8B, 8C, 28, 57(2), 59, 70(1), 84, 99, IOOA and IOOB and without 
prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty. 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions 
of this Treaty. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. SA. 
10 Article 100A states: 
I. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, 
the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 
8A. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in 
co-operation with the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market. 
2. Paragraph I shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement 
of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons. 
3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protec-
tion. 
4. If, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by the Council acting by a qualified 
majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions on grounds of major 
needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of the environment or the working 
environment, it shall notify the commission of these provisions. 
The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having verified that they are 
not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States. 
By of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 169 and 170, the Commission 
or any Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers 
that another Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in this Article. 
5. The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a 
safeguard clause authorizing the Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic 
reasons referred to in Article 36, provisional measures subject to a Community control 
procedure. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. 100A. 
II Some of the fields in which the White Paper envisages integration more advanced than in the 
United States are the mutual recognition by States of professional diplomas, the harmonization of 
indirect taxation and the proposed statute for a European company. In other important respects, most 
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dozen fields will jeopardize the centerpiece of the program: the removal of 
frontier controls within the Community. Finally, the program depends to a large 
extent on the use of directives. There is a substantial overlap between the 
objectives of the internal market program and the fields in which directives 
have to be used. The directive is the only instrument available for policies as 
diverse as the creation of an EEC product liability regime, the removal of 
exchange controls, the harmonization of VAT systems and the mutual recog-
nition of professional qualifications. It may well be asked whether, at the current 
stage of its legal development, the directive will prove equal to the task. I2 
II. THE CRISIS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Since a directive enacted by EEC institutions requires implementation by the 
Member States, it is particularly vulnerable to any friction between EEC and 
national interests. Such friction should in theory be minimal, because contro-
versial directives have usually required for their adoption the unanimous sup-
port of the Member States' governments as represented on the Council. In 
practice, however, the states which are keenest to support a new directive in the 
Council are often the most reluctant to give them effect or to notify imple-
menting provisions to the Commission. I3 A great potential for slippage exists 
between the adoption of a directive by the Council and the transfer of enforce-
able obligations into the law of each Member State. 
Some indication of the size of the problem is given by the Annual Reports to 
the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the Application of 
Community Law. I4 The most recent report reveals that 60 percent of all pro-
ceedings initiated against Member States by the Commission in 1986 concerned 
notably the absence of a common currency and a common language, the Community market will 
remain divided for the foreseeable future. 
12 For the place of the directive in the Community legal order see SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1987); T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY LAW (2nd ed. 1988); CAPELLI, LE DIRETTIVE COMUNITARIE (1983). For the implementation of 
directives see also the articles cited at supra note 3 and at infra notes 13, 29, 52 and 64. 
I' The extremes commonly cited are Denmark (hard negotiator but scrupulous implementer) and 
Italy (flexible in negotiations but notoriously poor at implementation); M. CAPPELLETTI, 2 INTEGRATION 
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 84 (1986) [hereinafter CAPPELLETTI]. 
For the constitutional and administrative background to implementation in the various Member States, 
see Meny and Ciavarini Azzi, Mises en Oeuvre Nationales des Politiques Communautaires: Les Directives de 
fa Communauti Economique Europeenne, 34 REV. FRANC. D'ADMIN. PUB. 177 (1985). For the position in 
two of the member states most frequently in default, see Lewaerts, The Application of Community Law 
in Belgium, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 253 (1986); Rossi, L'Attuazione in ltalia del Diritto Comunitario 
Mediante Atti Amministrativi, in DIRITTO COMUNITARIO E DEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAZIONALI (1987). 
14 COM (84) 181 final (for 1983); COM (85) 149 final (for 1984); COM (86) 204 final (for 1985); 
COM (87) 250 final (for 1986). 
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failure to implement directives properly. IS The Commission sent 372 letters of 
formal notice concerning directives in 1986, exactly twice the number sent in 
1983. 16 Even with the two newest Member States, Spain and Portugal, excluded 
from the count, the Commission admits that approximately 290 out of the 780 
directives for which the time limit for incorporation into national law had lapsed 
were 'giving rise to problems.'17 Of these 290 troublesome directives, one third 
were concerned with the completion of the EEC internal market. 18 
The crisis of implementation is not necessarily worsening. Only a small pro-
portion of infringement proceedings find their way to the Court,19 and the 
sharp increase in complaints over recent years may be better explained, by 
greater awareness of Community law or by increased diligence on the part of 
the Commission than by greater lawlessness among the governments of the 
Member States.20 On the other hand, inadequate implementation of directives 
may be a bigger problem than the infringement figures suggest. In the absence 
of a systematic procedure for examining the implementation of all directives in 
all Member States, the Commission relies heavily (though not exclusively)21 on 
parties affected by an infringement making a complaint.22 Inadequate imple-
mentation of directives sometimes comes to light only as a result of private 
litigation which is referred to the Court under Article 177, quite independently 
of the Commission. It is fair to assume that other examples of inadequate 
implementation never come to light at all. 
Member States' failure to implement directives is generally attributed to inef-
ficiency or incompetence rather than deliberate disobedience. 23 The Court oc-
casionally draws attention, however, to the deliberate refusal of a Member State 
15 COM (87) 250 final, at 4. The terms "failure properly to implement" and "inadequate implemen-
tation" are used here to embrace both non-implementation and purported implementation which is 
faulty. The distinction between the two is generally insignificant in legal terms: a Member State which 
has taken no specific implementing measures will often claim that pre-existing legislation itself consti-
tutes adequate "implementation." 
16 [d. at Table 4. 
17 [d. at 2. 
18 [d. at Annex B. 
19 One analysis of infringement proceedings between 1975 and 1981 concludes that barely five 
percent of infringement proceedings went as far as judgment. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 13, at 69. 
20 See the reference at COM (87) 250 final, at 4, to "a big operation to police the implementation 
of directives" launched by the Commission in 1983. 
21 The number of infringements detected on the Commission's own initiative is increasing. COM 
(87) 250 final, at 2 and Table 8. 
22 A forthcoming Report to the European Parliament by Amedee Turner MEP is expected to 
recommend the scrutiny of all implementing measures by lawyers answerable to the Commission. See 
also CAPPELLETTI, supra note 13, at 87. The author suggests that a new entity should be created, 
independent of direct Commission authority and principally responsible for ensuring legal ob.servance. 
/d. 
23 COM (87) 250 final, at 13, 15. 
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to take the necessary implementing measures. 24 More commonly, Member States 
will prolong the infringement proceedings in order to take full advantage of 
their failure to implement. They can then escape the censure of the Court by 
implementing the directive just before trial. Still more worrying, because it 
suggests not just disobedience but a possible threat to the perceived legitimacy 
of the Court, is the recent growth in proceedings under Article 171 for non-
observance of a previous judgment of the Court.25 
The temptation to deliberate disobedience will arguably increase with the 
advent of the Single European Act and majority voting on measures relevant 
to the completion of the internal market.26 If a Member State is outvoted in the 
Council on a politically controversial harmonizing measure, its authorities might 
feel more justified in refusing to implement a directive than they would have 
done had they given their assent to it under the old unanimity requirement. 
On the other hand, the qualified majority requirement has not created any 
particular problems in fields where it already applies, notably company law and 
the right of establishment. Finally, Article 100(A)(4) of the amended Treaty of 
Rome will in some cases lessen the frustration of an outvoted Member State by 
legitimizing derogations from the new harmonized measure.27 
Whatever the future trend, the present reality is that the inadequate imple-
mentation of directives represents not only a drain on the Commission's limited 
enforcement capacity, but also an obstacle to the credibility of EEC law as a 
whole and to the creation of the internal market in particular. The relative 
weakness of the directive as a policy instrument is underlined in the customs 
sphere by a Commission program to make regulations out of existing directives 
concerning customs warehouses and free zones. 28 In most areas, however, the 
only solution available to the Commission or to a private party affected by 
24 See, e.g., Case 128178, Commission v. United Kingdom ("Tachographs"), -E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
_, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 427 (1979), discussed in Gormley, The Application of Community Law in The 
United Kingdom, 1976-1985,23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 287 (1986). 
25 Table 7 of COM (87) 250 final contains a list of Court judgments not yet complied with as of 
December 31,1986. The Commission points out in its report, however, that non-compliance has only 
risen in proportion to the number of judgments delivered by the Court. Id. at 5. 
26 See Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. 100A. 
27 Article JOOA(4) permits Member States to apply their own national provisions in place of a 
harmonized measure on a wide range of grounds including those referred to in Article 36 (public 
morality, public policy, public security, public health, protection of national treasures and of industrial 
and commercial property) and protection of the environment and working environment. The scope 
of this potentially enormous derogation will depend on how the Commission and ultimately the Court 
exercise their supervisory power. Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. 100A(4). For different views 
of its likely effect see Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the" Single European Act," 24 COMMON MKT. 
L. REv. 9 (1987); Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. 
L. REv. 361 (1987). 
28 COM (87) 250 final, at 17. 
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inadequate implementation of a directive is to seek redress in accordance with 
the rules laid down by the European Court. 
III. THE SANCTIONS FOR INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION 
Undaunted by the less than promising material of Article 189, the Court has 
in the last fifteen years developed four principles by which the inadequate 
implementation of directives can be attacked. In descending order of boldness, 
these principles are as follows: 
(1) Acknowledging the direct effect of directives; 
(2) Refusing to give effect to national laws which conflict with directives; 
(3) Requiring national laws to be interpreted with reference to directives; 
(4) Restricting the Member States' discretion as to "the choice of form and 
methods." 
Of these four approaches, the first appears to have lost its impetus but to have 
preserved most of its early advances. The second is effectively moribund, and 
the third and fourth are still developing. After briefly summarizing the first 
three approaches, the fourth approach-which is relatively recent and has 
attracted little academic attention-will be considered in more detail. 
A. Acknowledging the Direct Effect of Directives29 
The Court's first and most radical approach was to develop the doctrine that 
an unimplemented or wrongly implemented directive may nonetheless be di-
rectly effective against a Member State. 30 Even though a Member State has not 
taken the implementing measures envisaged by the text of the directive and by 
Article 189, the directive may still bestow rights on individuals which these 
individuals can enforce in national courts. 
The concept of a directly effective directive, addressed to Member States but 
invocable by individuals, is not implicit in the wording of Article 189. Direct 
29 Among the noteworthy articles on this subject are Winter, supra note 3; Ayral, La Transposition des 
Directives dans les Droits Nationaux, 210 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 411 (1977); Easson, The "Direct 
Effect" of EEC Directives, 28 INT'L & CaMP. L.Q. 319 (1979); Pescatore, L'Effet des Directives Communau-
taires-Une Tentative de Demythification, 23 RECUEIL DALLOZ-SIREY (1980); and "The Doctrine of Direct 
Effect": An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983). 
'0 Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1337, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 
347 (1974); Case 148178, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep. 1629, I Common 
Mkt. L.R. 96 (1980); Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
53, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 499 (1982); Case 271182, Auer v. Ministere Public, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.]. 
Rep. 2727, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 373 (1979). The Court (though not every Advocate General) has 
generally preserved a verbal distinction between the "direct effects" of a regulation and "similar effects" 
of a directive. The most significant difference is that whereas member states are not permitted to 
implement the requirements of a regulation, they remain obliged to implement a directive even when 
its provisions have become directly effective. 
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effect has its legal basis in two principles: the status of Community law as an 
integral part of the legal system of the Member States,31 and the Civil law 
doctrine that a legal measure must be presumed to have an effet utile or useful 
effect. The application of these principles to the directive, buttressed by an 
adventurous interpretation of Article 17732 and by the estoppel-like notion that 
Member States should not be able to rely on their own failure to implement,33 
is one of the most impressive pieces of judicial activism in the Court's history.34 
Direct effect provides a powerful countercheck to the non-implementation of 
directives. The use of the direct effect doctrine is not restricted to EEC courts, 
but is available in local courts to individuals who have rights under directives 
which should have been implemented. The directly effective provisions of a 
directive, without having the precise legal force of a regulation, may in practice 
constitute an equally effective vehicle for the transfer of EEC obligations into 
national law. 
A number of reasons exist, however, why direct effect is not by itself an 
adequate response to the problems of non-implementation and defective im-
plementation. First, direct effect can be accorded only to a provision which is 
"sufficiently clear and precise."35 Though this requirement will not always be 
interpreted strictly,36 its mere existence raises a doubt as to the direct effect of 
many nontechnical directives. 
Second, the relevant provision must be "unconditional":37 it will not be directly 
effective if it affords some discretion to the Member States regarding the 
contents of the rule to be transferred into their legal systems. This requirement 
" Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. 
Comm. Ct.]. Rep 585, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425 (1964). 
32 This argument was expressed as follows by the Court in Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 
1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1337, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 347 (1974): "Article 177, which enjoins national 
courts to refer to the Court questions concerning the validity and interpretation of all acts of the 
Community institutions, without distinction, implies furthermore that these acts may be invoked by 
individuals in the national courts." However this argument has not been used in the more recent cases. 
33 Case 148178, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1629, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 
96 (1980). 
3. The Court's reputation for activism has won it mixed praise. See RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY 
IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING (1986); 
Cappelletti, 12 EUR. L. REV. 3 (1987) and Weiler, The Courl of Juslice on Trial, 24 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 555; and Pescatore, La Carence du Legislaleur Communaulaire el Ie Devoir du Juge, in RECHTSVER-
GLEICHUNG, EUROPARECHT UND STAATENINTEGRATION, GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FOR LEONTIN-jEAN CON-
STANTINESCO 559. 
"Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1337, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 
347 (1974). 
'6 Per Advocate-General Warner in Case 131179, R v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex 
parle Santillo, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1337, _Common Mkt. L.R. _(l9XX). 
'7 Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1337, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 
347 (1974). 
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too has sometimes been liberally interpreted,3S but it remains a significant bar-
rier to the direct effect of many directives which, for political or practical 
reasons, give the Member States a certain flexibility as to substance.39 
Third, the terms of a directive may be invoked against a Member State only 
after the expiration of the implementation period specified in the directive,40 
which is typically two years from notification. Therefore, even a directly effective 
provision is at best a delayed-action weapon, whether in the hands of the 
Commission or of a private party. 
A further block seems to have been placed on the expansion of direct effect 
by a recent judgment of the European Court41 in an Article 177 reference from 
the United Kingdom on the interpretation of a sex discrimination directive. 
After several years of prevarication on the point, the Court decided in Marshall 
that a directive had only "vertical" direct effect42 (conferring rights against 
national governments or other bodies exercising public authority43) and not 
"horizontal" direct effect (conferring rights against private parties), even though 
the directive in question gave effect to a provision of the Treaty of Rome (Article 
119) which was itself directly effective in a horizontal as well as a vertical sense.44 
The repercussions of the Marshall decision extend well beyond sex discrimina-
tion. They will, for example, affect the Commission's attempts to place obliga-
tions on private corporations by means of the company law and consumer 
directives. The Marshall decision is a serious blow, though not an unexpected 
,. See, e.g., id. That case held that a safeguard clause would fall foul of the "unconditionality" 
requirement only if invoked. See alm Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 E. 
Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 53, I Common Mkt. L.R. 499 (1982), in which an exempting provision of the Sixth 
VAT Directive was held to be "unconditional" even though it required member states to lay down 
conditions regarding the application of the exemption. 
,. See, e.g., Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1891, 
in which a provision of a directive requiring a remedy for refusal of employment on grounds of sex 
but not specifying the nature of the remedy was held not to meet the unconditionality requirement. 
40 Case 148178, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1629, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 
96 (1980). 
41 Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 1 
Common Mkt. L.R. 688 (1986). See also Arnull, The Direct Effect of Directives: Grasping the Nettle, 35 
INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 939 (1986). 
42 "Vertical" direct effect works in one direction only and does not enable a Member State to rely 
on an unimplemented directive as against an individual. Case 80/86, Officier van Justitie v. Kolpinghuis 
Nijmegen BV, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1987 (not yet published). 
4' Bodies exercising public authority extend as far as the French Ordre Nationale des Veterinaires: 
Case 271182, Auer v. Ministere Public, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2727, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 373 
(1983). A public authority is however bound by a directly effective provision of a directive even in its 
capacity as an employer. See Marshall, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 688. 
44 Though the court could have restricted itself to Directive 76/207, it expressed itself in broad 
terms: 
[It follows] that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual, and that a 
provision of a directive may not be relied on as such against such a person. 
1 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 688, 711 (1986). 
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one,45 to the principle of direct effect and to the power of the directive as an 
instrument for controlling the legal relationship between private parties. 
The direct effect doctrine has significantly strengthened the directive as an 
instrument of EEC policy; indeed it may be doubted whether the directive-led 
drive for 1992 could realistically ,have been envisaged without the discipline 
provided by direct effect. Yet the limitations on the doctrine exclude potential 
plaintiffs from large areas of concern to them, and the head of the recalcitrant 
Member State is further 3trengthened by the lack of certainty as to whether a 
given provision is directly effective or not. The Marshall judgment suggests that 
the present concern of the Court is to consolidate the advances of the 1970s, 
rather than face the legal complexities and political risks46 of attempting to 
extend the doctrine further. 47 
B. Refusing to Give Effect to a Conflicting National Law 
Aware of the limitations of the direct effect doctrine, the Court made an 
ingenious but short-lived attempt to outflank it in three decisions dating from 
the late 1970s.48 These decisions appeared to signal the emergence of a general 
duty on national courts to prevent reliance by their national authorities on a 
45 The judgment of the court in Case 148178, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
1629, I Common Mkt. L.R. 96 (1980), grounded the direct effect of directives on a kind of estoppel 
preventing a member state from relying on its own failure to implement. This justification cannot be 
applied to horizontal direct effect. See also Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 53, I Common Mkt. L.R. 499 (1982). 
46 The chief of these risks is that the jurisprudence of the court will not be accepted by the national 
tribunals of the member states. The highest French administrative court, the Consei1 d'Etat, refuses 
to accept that a Community directive can be directly effective. See, e.g., Ministre de l'Interieur v. Cohn-
Bendit, [1970] S. Jur. 155, I Common Mkt. L.R. 543 (1980), discussed by Simon and Dowrick, Effect 
of EEC Directives in France: The Views of the Conseit d'Etat, 95 L.Q. REV. 376 (1979). This position has 
recently begun to look extremely isolated, however, both within France (where the Cour de Cassation 
takes the other view) and in the Community as a whole. For the Italian position following the landmark 
judgment of the Corte Costituzionale in S.p.A. Granital v. Amministrazione Finanzaria, 21 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 756 (1984) see La Pergola and Del Duca, Community Law, International Law and the Italian 
Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L. L. 598 (1985). The German position has changed as the result of the 
Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court) in Case _ BVff{GE _ AZ.2 BvR 
687/85 (November 20, 1987). Quashing a decision of the Bundesfinanzhof on the application of the 
Sixth VAT Directive, the Bundesverfassungsgericht affirmed the obligation on all German courts to 
accord direct effect to directives on the principles laid down by the European Court. See also LAWS OF 
ENGLAND. supra note 5, at 1.83. 
47 See also Koopmans. The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration, 35 Infl & Compo L.Q. 
925 (1986). 
48 Case 51176. Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Ac-
cijnzen. 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 113, I Common Mkt. L.R. 413 (1977); Case 38177. Enka BV v. 
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Arnhem, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2203. 2 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 212 (1978); Case 21178, Delkvist v. Anklogemyndigheden, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, 
I Common Mkt. L.R. 372 (1979). See Duffy. EEC Directives: Judicial Control of National Implementation. 
41 MOD. L. REV. 219 (1978); Timmermans, Directives: Their Effect within the National Legal Systems, 16· 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 533 (1979). 
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provIsIOn of national law which is incompatible with an EEC directive. 49 This 
principle lacks the power of direct effect, for it would result not in the appli-
cation of the relevant directive but merely in the non-application of the offend-
ing national law. In practice, however, the threat of a legal vacuum would 
provide a powerful incentive for legislation to be amended in accordance with 
the directive. By deliberately divorcing the formulation of this new duty from 
the conditions traditionally attached to direct effect, 50 the Court appeared to be 
opening the way for the application of a very similar principle to areas never 
penetrated by the direct effect doctrine. 
For one reason or another, this divorce proved to be unsustainable. Though 
the Court in subsequent cases has continued to require national courts not to 
apply national provisions incompatible with a directive, it has emphasized that 
this duty applies only when the obligation imposed by the directive is "uncon-
ditional and sufficiently precise" and when the implementation period is over.51 
These conditions are identical to those attaching to direct effect. The doctrine 
which the Court attempted to establish in the early cases has now been quietly 
assimilated into the doctrine of direct effect, and can no longer be said to add 
anything to it. 
C. Requiring National Laws to be Interpreted with Reference to Directives52 
At the same time as it has developed the doctrine of direct effect, the Court 
has been concerned with strengthening the power of the directive even in fields 
where direct effect or a similar doctrine is out of the question. It has sought to 
minimize the distinction between implemented and unimplemented directives 
by means of the emerging principle-grounded partly on Article 5 of the EEC 
Treaty53-that national tribunals are required to use the text of any directive 
as an aid in interpreting the relevant national rules. 
49 See Case 21178, Delkvist v. Anklogemyndigheden, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, I Common 
Mkt. L.R. 372 (1979). 
50 Case 38177, In Enka, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2203, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 212 (1978), the 
Court contrived to reply to a straight question on direct effect with reference only to the Verbond 
decision and without mentioning the Van Duyn limitations on direct effect as generally applied. 
51 See, e.g., Case 148/87, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629, I Common 
Mkt. L.R. 96 (1980); Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
53, I Common Mkt. L.R. 499 (1982). 
52 See Timmermans, supra note 48, at 533; Amull, Sanctioning Discrimination, 9 EUR. L. REV. 267 
(1984). 
53 Article 5 states: 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives 
of this Treaty. 
Treaty of Rome, supra note I, at art. 5. 
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This principle was first developed in Article 177 references from tribunals 
which themselves appear to have accepted it in advance.54 This can be deduced 
from the fact that they asked the Court to interpret directives which were clearly 
not directly effective. The current leading case is Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen,55 a case concerning the compatibility of Council Directive 76/207 
(discrimination in matters of access to employment) with the remedies furnished 
by the German implementing legislation. The Court held that the sanctions 
provision of the directive was not directly effective, and could not be relied 
upon by an individual to obtain specific compensation which was not provided 
for in the national implementing legislation. Nevertheless, it also held that: 
In applying the national law and in particular the provisions of a 
national law specifically introduced in order to implement Directive 
No. 76/207, national courts are required to interpret their national 
law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in 
order to achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of 
Article 189. (emphasis added). 
The Court added further that the wording and the purpose of the directive 
were such that the compensation provided for in the implementing legislation 
could not on its own be considered sufficient. 
Taken at face value, this extract from the judgment suggests that the duty to 
interpret national law in conformity with an EEC directive applies not only to 
specific implementing provisions but to all national rules falling within the scope 
of a directive. If this is indeed the case, national courts have the power to 
supplement inadequate implementing rules by a sympathetic interpretation of 
background legislation. 56 This will be so even when implementation of a direc-
tive is nonexistent rather than just defective. 
This bold reading of the duty to interpret national laws in the light of 
directives is not supported by other parts of the Von Colson judgment, 57 and was 
disapproved by Advocate General Slynn in the Marshall case.58 The bold ap-
proach was however reaffirmed by the recent decision of the Court in Officer 
van justitie v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV.5Y In this case it was undisputed that the 
54 Case 32174, Friedrich Haaga GmbH, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1201; Case 111/75, Impresa 
Costruzioni Comm. Quirino Mazzalai v. Ferrovia del Renon, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 657, I Common 
Mkt. L.R. _(1977). 
55 Case 14/83, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1891. 
56 The German government argued in Von Colson that the required remedies might have been 
available under other provisions of German law. [d. 
57 See, e.g., id., paragraph 3 of the ruling itself. 
58 Case 152/84, Marshall v. South West Hampshire and Area Health Authority, I Common Mkt. 
L.R. 688 (1987). 
59 Case 80/86, Officier van Justitie v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1987 (not yet 
published). 
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Netherlands had taken no measures at the relevant time to implement Council 
Directive 801777 on the marketing of mineral waters. The Dutch Officer of 
Justice, for the purpose of a criminal prosecution, nonetheless wanted to use 
the specific requirements of the directive as an aid to the interpretation of a 
pre-existing national rule which prohibited the stocking of defective produce. 
The Court held that the directive could not be used as an aid in interpreting 
the national law. The only reason for this, however, was that the Von Colson rule 
of interpretation, if applied in this rather unusual criminal context, would 
conflict with two general principles of Community law: legal certainty and non-
retroactivity. In the absence of such conflicts,60 the Court expressed the opinion 
that the Von Colson rule of interpretation should apply to any relevant national 
law, and not simply to those enacted expressly to give force to a directive. Most 
striking of all, it appears from the Court's judgment that the rule of interpre-
tation is applied even if the time for implementation of the directive has not 
yet elapsed. 
If the Court continues to follow the bold approach of the Kolpinghuis Nijmegen 
case, another significant blow will have been struck against Member States, 
which rely on non-implementation or incomplete implementation of directives 
in order to escape their EEC obligations. The Court's refusal to restrict the duty 
of interpretation to specific implementing legislation has the further advantage 
of consistency with the line of authority establishing that a directive may be 
sufficiently implemented without specific implementing legislation.6' 
The Von Colson and Kolpinghuis Nijmegen decisions are bold in another sense, 
for they risk decoupling the jurisprudence of the Court from the position as 
understood in the Member States. As a rule of interpretation, the Von Colson 
principle applies only within the limits permitted by the various nationallaws.62 
It has no power to exclude the operation of other interpretational rules. The 
Court's effort to secure acceptance of the Von Colson principle thus depends 
heavily on the cooperation of national tribunals, both in sending suitable cases 
on preliminary reference under Article 177 and in generally adhering to the 
Court's guidelines. Some jurisdictions have already made significant steps to-
wards acceptance of the principle; but in the last resort there is nothing to stop 
national courts from being as rebellious as national governments.63 
60 An unresolved question is whether other general principles of Community law such as equity or 
proportionality could be evoked so as to avoid the rule of interpretation. 
61 See infra, note 85 and accompanying text. 
62 Case 14/83, Von Colson, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1891. 
63 Even after the Von Colson case, English courts have been far from consistent on the use of 
Community directives as an aid to the interpretation of implementing measures. The House of Lords 
in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Apple and Pear Development Council, 2 Common Mkt. 
L.R. 634 (1987), took the strict view that a court was required to construe implementing legislation in 
the light of the Sixth VAT Directive and as intended to carry out its purpose, if such a construction 
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D. Restricting Member States' Discretion as to the Choice of Form and Methods64 
The three approaches already discussed are linked by their common purpose 
of giving meaning to the first part of the Article 189 definition of a directive: 
"A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed .... " The last few years have seen the development 
of a fourth approach, based this time on the scope of the subsequent provision: 
" ... but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." 
The limits imposed by the Court on the choice of form and methods open to 
an implementing Member State have evolved out of a series of Article 169 cases 
brought by the Commission for non-implementation and/or faulty implemen-
tation of directives. 65 All save the latest in this series of complaints have been 
upheld; but there are signs in the more recent decisions that this approach too 
may be nearing the limits of its development. It may therefore not be premature 
to attempt a broad summary of the principles laid down by the Court on the 
"choice of form and methods." 
1. The Court Will Not Accept Any Excuse for Non-Implementation 
A Member State which does not expect to be able to comply with the deadline 
for implementing a directive can apply to the appropriate institution for an 
extension of that deadline.66 In the absence of such an application the Court-
in keeping with its general refusal to distinguish between the different organs 
of a Member State on which an obligation rests-is impervious to excuses for 
failure to implement. It held in the Type Approval case67 that: "a Member State 
is possible. By contrast, Warner J., in National Smokeless Fuels Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 227 (1986), was prepared to look at the text of directives on company 
taxation only if the implementing legislation was ambiguous. See aL50 Gormley, The Application of 
Community Law in the United Kingdom, 1976-1985, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 287, 306-07 (1986). I am 
unaware of any English case in which the existence of an obligation to construe pre-existing background 
legislation in a manner consonant with a directive was even contemplated. 
64 See Green, Directives, Equity and the Protection of Individual Rights 9 EUR. L. REV. 295 (1984); Molinier, 
Note sous CjCE, 23 Mai 1986 (af! 29/84), Commission C/RFA (application des directives---4roit d'etablissement), 
3 REV. TRIM. DR. EUROP., 479 (1986). 
6; Case 102179, Commission v. Belgium, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473,2 Common Mkt. L.R. 622 
(1982), ("Type Approval"); Cases 96, 97, 100/81, Commission v. Netherlands, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1791; Case 300, 301/81, Commission v. italy, Belgium, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 449, 2 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 430 (1984) ("Banking Directive"); Case 145/82, Commission v. italy, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 711, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 148 (1984) ("Marketing of Medicines"); Case 248/83, Commission v. 
Germany, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1459; Case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 1661; Case 363/85, Commission v. italy, Judgment of Apr. 9,1987. (In the text I shall use the 
descriptive names given above so as to avoid the confusion of cases with the same name.) 
66 See Case 301181, Commission v. Belgium 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 449, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 
430 (1984). 
67 Case 102/79, Commission v. Belgium 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1473,2 Common Mkt. L.R. 436, 
para. 11 (1986). 
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cannot rely upon domestic difficulties or provisions of its national legal system, 
even its constitutional system, for the purpose of justifying a failure to comply 
with obligations and time limits contained in Community directives." In addi-
tion, the Court held that late implementation is not excused by difficulties in 
interpreting a directive68 or by the direct applicability of the relevant provi-
sions.69 More recently the Court has taken the offensive, by arguing that the 
participation of a Member State in preparatory drafting sessions should ensure 
that it is able to implement the directive on time.70 
The Court has nonetheless rejected one of the Commission's arguments on 
non-implementation. The Commission argued in Commission v. Netherlands7l that 
failure to notify the Commission of implementing measures taken, which is an 
extremely common infringement of many directives, should raise a rebuttable 
presumption that the Member State has failed to put into effect the necessary 
implementing measures. The Court did not follow Advocate General Capotorti's 
reasoning and refused to acknowledge such a presumption. The Court now 
requires the Commission to prove a failure to implement in each case.72 
2. A Member State's Discretion in Implementing a Directive Varies Accord-
ing to the Aim of the Directive 
The earlier cases frequently emphasized that the latitude allowed to the 
implementing Member State varied according to the objective of the EEC di-
rective. The Court stated this principle in the case of Enka BV v. Inspecteur der 
Invoerrechten en Accinzen, Arnhem73 as follows: 
It emerges from the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty 
that the choice left to the Member States as regards the form of the 
measures and the methods used in their adoption by the national 
authorities depends upon the result which the Councilor Commis-
sion wishes to see achieved.74 
In the Type Approval case,75 similarly, a case concerning highly detailed harmo-
nization directives issued pursuant to Article 100, the Court held that Member 
68 [d. at para. 12. 
69 [d. at para. 13. 
70 Case 364/85, Commission v. Italy, Judgment of January 29. 1987 (not yet published); Case 134/ 
86. Commission v. Belgium. Judgment of June 4. 1987 (not yet published). 
71 Case 96/81. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1791. 
72 This is very much in keeping with the "strict approach" to procedural formalities which the court 
has developed vis-a-vis the Commission in recent years. See. e.g .• Case 138/85. Commission v. Greece. 
Order of Oct. 3. 1986. 
73 Case 38177. 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2203. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 212 (1978). 
74 [d. at 2212. 
75 Case 102179. Commission v. Belgium. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 449. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 622 
(1982). 
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States were obliged to introduce "measures sufficient to meet the purpose of 
each directive."76 The wording of the directives, their nature, and their legis-
lative context were all factors inclining the Court to the view that they had not 
been properly implemented by the Belgian authorities. 
In subsequent cases on Article 100 directives, the Court has generally echoed 
these references to their detailed nature, their aim of approximation and some-
times to their wording.77 Nonetheless, there are clear signs that the Court is 
now paying less attention to the aim of specific directives, and is instead moving 
towards the formulation of general principles applicable to the implementation 
of all directives. The directive in the Banking Directive cases,78 issued pursuant 
to Article 57 of the Treaty, had according to its own preamble the relatively 
modest and imprecise aim of reducing the discretion of bodies authorizing 
credit institutions by eliminating "the most obstructive differences" between 
national laws. A directive such as this is at the opposite end of the spectrum 
from a technical harmonization directive on type approval. The Court, however, 
defined the Member States' discretion as to implementation in almost identical 
terms to those used in the Type Approval case, and did not refer to the different 
aims of the directives. The same point emerges from Commission v. Germany.79 
Though the case concerned mutual recognition directives pursuant to Articles 
49, 57, 66 and 235, the judgment of the Court elaborated upon the criteria 
developed in cases on Article 100 directives. It is notable also that the most 
recent cases, in contrast to the earlier ones, make little or no mention of the 
wording used in the implementation clause of the directive.80 
Judicial emphasis on the aim of a directive is thus waning, and the formulation 
of general principles of implementation is taking its place. The opinion of 
Advocate General Reischl in the Marketing of Medicines case8l mentions two such 
general principles: "same legal force" and "clarity and certainty in legal situa-
tions." They will be considered in turn. 
76 The aim of the directives was to eliminate technical barriers to trade by introducing a system of 
"EEC type approval" for motor vehicles and tractors. Once the various technical checks had been 
made to the standards specified in the directive. type approval was to be granted for the whole EEC 
market. 
77 See. e.g .• Case 96/81. Commission v. Netherlands. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1791 (scientific 
standards for bathing water); Case 145/82. Re the Marketing of Medicines. 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
148.1 Common Mkt. L.R. 148 (1984). 
78 Cases 300. 301181. Commission v. Italy. Belgium. 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 449.2 Common 
Mkt. L.R. 430 (1984). 
79 Case 29/84. 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1661. 
80 The implementation clause typically requires member states to introduce "all measures necessary" 
and/or "the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary" for compliance with the direc-
tive. 
81 Case 145/82. Commission v. Italy, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 711. 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 148 
(1984). 
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3. The "Same Legal Force" Principle 
In the Type Approval case,82 the Court stated: 
It is apparent from the whole of these provIsIOns and from the 
nature of the measures which they prescribe that the directives in 
question are meant to be turned into provisions of national law 
which have the same legal force as those which apply in the Member 
States in regard to the checking and type-approval of motor vehicles 
or tractors.83 (emphasis added). 
107 
The Court went on to hold that the implementing measures "in this case" had 
to be "equivalent to those which are applied under the national legal system for 
the purpose of securing observance of requirements which are described as 
'mandatory' in the preamble to the two framework directives ... "84 The mean-
ing of "same legal force" is unclear. Advocate General Reischl in the Marketing 
of Medicines case85 took it to mean that implementing provisions should have 
"the same legal force as those governing the same subject-matter in the other 
Member States." It is true that the Court will sometimes look for guidance as 
to what is reasonable to the implementing measures taken in other Member 
States.86 Advocate-General Reischl's interpretation, however, suggests that the 
obligations of one implementing state would vary according to the manner of 
implementation selected previously by other Member States. Apart from being 
inherently unlikely, this interpretation is inconsistent with the second above-
quoted passage from the Type Approval case, which refers to "the national legal 
system" and not to other Member States. 
Nor will it suffice to explain the "same legal force" requirement as an unvar-
ying obligation on Member States to introduce measures of the same type or 
effect as those which before the issuance of the directive governed the subject 
matter covered by the directive. This interpretation makes sense in the context 
of a harmonizing directive, but not in the context of a directive which gives 
statutory force to something previously regulated less formally, or to a directive 
which seeks to impose obligations where none existed before.87 The common 
82 Case 102179, Commission v. Belgium, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1473,2 Common Mkt. L.R. 622 
(1982). 
83 1980 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1473, 1486. 
84 !d. at 1487. 
85 Case 145/82, Commission v. Italy, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep. 711, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 148 
(1984). 
86 In Case 61/81, Commission v. UK, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2601, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 284 
(1982). a case concerning the implementation of the provisions of Council Directive 75/117 regarding 
equal pay, the Court asked the Commission to supply details of the principal national provisions 
adopted by the other Member States. 
87 For example, the clean water directive in Case 96/81, Commission v. Netherlands, 1982 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 1791, and the mutual recognition directive in Case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, 1985 
E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1661. 
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sense solution must be to apply the "same legal force" requirement only where 
suggested by the construction of the directive, and to interpret the requirement 
as meaning simply that an EEC regime is not to be given less legal force than 
the national regime it replaces. 
4. The "Clarity and Legal Certainty" Principle 
A Member State is sometimes in compliance with a directive or with a sub-
stantial part of it by virtue of legislation which predates the directive.88 For an 
implementing measure of whatever vintage to be fully effective, however, it 
must comply with a number of criteria recently developed by the Court and 
usually classified under the name of clarity and legal certainty.89 
The effective meaning of the clarity and legal certainty requirement is that 
the provisions of a directive must be given effect by "national provisions of a 
binding nature,"90 or by "provisions which have the character of law."91 It is not 
sufficient for a Member State to prove that its policy in the relevant area is 
"substantially in harmony with the aims of the directives."92 It must demonstrate, 
also that the applicable measures are not "mere administrative practices." The 
Court maintains that a measure is an administrative practice, under the standard 
twin tests, if the measure "by [its] nature may be altered at the whim of the authorities 
and lack[s] the appropriate publicity."93 (emphasis added). Most of the case law 
discussions of clarity and legal certainty boil down to an application of these 
twin tests. The twin tests may be summarized as imposing the requirements of 
binding force and of appropriate publicity. 
Measures which have been held to be insufficient for lack of binding force 
include Dutch water quality guidelines94 and Italian ministerial orders and 
circulars concerning the marketing of medicines.95 Ministerial orders and cir-
88 Case 100/81, Commission v. Netherlands, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1837, _Common Mkt. L.R. 
_; Case 363/85. Commission v. Italy. Judgment of Apr. 9. 1987 (not yet published). See also the 
extraordinary case 420/85, Commission v. Italy. Judgment of July 7. 1987 (not yet published). in which 
Italy demonstrated that it was physically unable to implement parts of a directive relevant to water 
transport because it shared no navigable waterways with other member states. 
89 This formulation originates in Case 102179. Commission v. Belgium. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
1473.2 Common Mkt. L.R. 622 (1982); see also Case 248/83, Commission v. Germany. 1985 E. Comm. 
Ct.]. Rep. 1459. 
90 Case 96/81. Commission v. Netherlands. 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1791. 
91 Case 145/82. Commission v. Italy. 1983 E. Comm. Ct. ]. Rep. 711, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 148 
(1984). per Advocate-General Reisch!. 
92 Case 96/81. Commission v. Netherlands. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1791. per Advocate-General 
Capolorti. 
93 Case 96/81. Commission v. Netherlands. 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1791. 
94 !d. 
9'Case 145/82. Commission v. Italy. 1983 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 711. 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 148 
(1984). The court appeared to consider that these measures were "mere administrative practices." 
Advocate General Reischl thought they had "a different legal quality" from mere administrative 
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culars concerning the marketing of medicines also failed the "appropriate pub-
licity" test on the ground that as internal administrative instructions, there was 
no requirement to publish them officially.96 
The Court considered both of the tests for a "mere administrative practice" 
in Commission v. Germany,97 a case on the mutual recognition of nurses' qualifi-
cations pursuant to Council Directives 77/452 and 77/453. On the binding force 
point, the German authorities argued that their established practice was consis-
tent with the directives, and that the continuation of this practice was guaranteed 
by three superior principles of German constitutional or administrative law.9s 
This concept was referred to at the hearing and by Advocate General Slynn as 
the "Selbstverbindung der Verwaltung" (the self-binding of the Administration). 
The Court acknowledged that general legal principles of constitutional or ad-
ministrative law might indeed be capable of rendering specific legislative action 
superfluous. This was however subject to the fourfold proviso that: 
(1) The "general legal principles" guarantee that the national au-
thorities will in fact apply the directive fully; 
(2) Where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals: 
(a) The legal position arising from those principles is sufficiently 
precise and clear; 
(b) The persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights; 
(c) Where appropriate, the persons concerned are afforded the 
possibility of relying on their rights before the national courts.99 
The general legal principles of German law failed to satisfy any of the provisos. 
The Court covered the last three with the remark that "the legal analysis relied 
practices, but considered them insufficient nonetheless on an application of the "binding force" and 
"appropriate publicity" tests. 
96 The strong emphasis placed by the Court on appropriate publicity is doubtless motivated partly 
by the idea that the removal of barriers is useless without widespread and accurate knowledge that 
they have been removed. See Case 167/73, Commission v. France, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, in 
which the potential confusion caused by the retention of a provision of the Code du Travail Maritime 
which had been succeeded by an EEC regulation was enough to justify a finding of discrimination 
under Article 48 of the Treaty. See also Fourth Annual Report to the European Parliament on 
Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community Law, COM (87) 250 Final, at 12. 
97 Case 29/84, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1661, Judgment of May 23, 1985 (not yet published). A 
French translation of this judgment with a note by Molinier has been published in REv. TRIM. DR. 
EUROP. 1986, no. 3, pp. 479-90. More than two years after the judgment, the implementing law 
eventually passed in response to it is itself under scrutiny by the Commissioll. See Fourth Annual 
Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community 
Law, COM(87) 250 final, Table 7. 
98 These were the German constitutional principles of equal treatment, the Community principle of 
nondiscrimination, directly applicable in German law, and the German doctrine of administrative 
estoppel. 
99 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1661, 1673. This formula was substantially repeated in Case 363/85, 
Commission v. Italy, Judgment of April 9, 1987 (not yet published). 
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on by the German Government is not such as to create a situation which is 
sufficiently precise, clear and transparent as to enable nationals of other Member 
States to discover their rights and to rely upon them."lOo In a later comment, 
the Court suggests that general principles of national law will in practice rarely 
suffice to guarantee compliance with precise and detailed directives. 101 
The Court effectively assimilated the appropriate publicity test into its analysis 
of the binding force requirement. Advocate General Slynn, considering the 
point separately, spoke of two reasons for the publicity requirement: 
(1) to enable the Community citizen to know his rights and have at 
his disposal a text on which he can rely simply and cheaply; 
(2) to ensure sufficient transparency to enable the Commission to 
check effectively whether a directive has been implemented. 102 
The requirement that the implementing text be simply and cheaply available to 
citizens of other Member States is implicit also in the Court's formulation. 
Advocate General Slynn's second reason is a reminder that appropriate publicity 
is required even for directives which do not create rights for individuals. 
The Court's jurisprudence on "choice of form and methods" leaves a number 
of questions unanswered, not least as to when, and for whom, a directive is 
"intended to create rights."103 There are signs, however, that the Court will not 
go much further in trying to restrict the discretion of the Member States under 
Article 189. The Court continues to insist that "the implementation of a directive 
does not necessarily require legislative action in every Member State."I04 Simi-
larly, it has stopped short of requiring the adoption of particular phrases in the 
implementing legislation, even in those instances where the directive is a rela-
tively technical one. lOS 
In only a few years, the Court has traveled from an ill-defined prohibition 
on "mere administrative practices," apparently limited to certain types of direc-
tives, to something approaching a general requirement that the rights derived 
from a directive be publicized throughout the EEC and made legally enforceable 
by all those intended to benefit from them. This development can only 
strengthen the head of the Commission as against the Member States, particu-
100 [d. at 1674. 
101 [d. at 1675. 
102 [d. at 1666. 
10' Case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1661. 
104 [d. at 1673. 
105 In Case 363/85, Commission v. Italy, Judgment of April 9, 198'7 (not yet published), the court 
was asked to consider the non-transposition into Italian law of three definitions in a directive on 
animal feedstuffs. Finding that the scope of the pre-existing Italian legislation had not been shown to 
differ from that of the Community rules, the Court refused to condemn "a simple terminological 
difference which could have no possible effect on the fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the 
Community system." 
1988] INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF EEC DIRECTIVES III 
larly with regard to the implementation of directives in fields (e.g. financial 
services) where national rules have not always had statutory force or created 
legal rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The case law of the last dozen years on the implementation and effect of 
directives is a powerful reproach to those who contend that the Court has lost 
its will or capacity for innovation. By the end of 1975 there had only been one 
judicial finding of failure to implement a directive,106 and the notion of a 
directive taking effect without implementing measures was in its infancy. Twelve 
years later, the Court has a range of weapons available against inadequate 
implementation of directives, all of which involve national tribunals and private 
individuals, rather than just the Commission, in the struggle against reluctant 
Member States. The Member States' discretion as to the manner and form of 
implementation has been limited by principles developed in a large number of 
successful infringement proceedings, and designed to safeguard the rights con-
ferred by a directive. lo7 Member States that fail to implement a directive within 
the allotted time risk having it applied directly against them, almost as though 
it were a regulation. 108 Finally, national courts are being encouraged to use 
directives as an aid to the interpretation of relevant national laws, even if these 
laws were not intended to implement the directive and even if the time allotted 
for implementing the directive is still running. 109 
These advances do not afford directives the same legal force as regulations. 
The distinction drawn in Article 189, combined with the absence of effective 
sanctions against disobedient national courts and governments, has prevented 
the Court from exploring to the full all the avenues that it has opened. This is 
evident in the Court's abandonment of its audacious attempt to extend direct 
effect under another name in the Verbond llO line of cases, and in the decision 
in Marshall lll not to give unimplemented directives the force of law against 
private parties. 
It takes an optimist to believe that the internal market program will be fully 
in place by December 31, 1992.112 The Single European Act, widely viewed by 
106 Ayral, La Transposition des Directives dans les Droits Nationoux, 210 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 411, 
422 (1977). 
107 See supra notes 64-100 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
III Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 1 
Common Mkt. L.R. 688 (1986). 
112 See Second Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
implementation of the Commission's White Paper on completing the internal market, May 11, 1987, 
COM (87) 203 Final. 
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integrationists as too little and too late, will at best only partially dispel the 
lourdeurii3 which seems inseparable from the EEC legislative process. 1l4 The 
failure of Member States properly to implement directives is certainly another 
source of delay, and a further obstacle to the prompt achievement of the goals 
of the White Paper. Yet in view of the basic structural weakness of the directive, 
and the vital part it has been given in the achievement of the internal market, 
the wonder is not that inadequate implementation exists but that it has been 
kept within manageable bounds. For the legal principles it continues to fashion 
and apply in this field, the European Court deserves some unfashionable praise. 
ii3 Lourdeur is the -tendency of legislative proposals to suffer from procedural blockages and the 
dilution of substantive content. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 13. 
ii4 A recent Director General of the Commission Legal Service, now the chief Commission Spokes-
man, has written: "The provisions of the Single European Act on the internal market are probably 
not bold enough to achieve the objective laid down in Article 8A by the given deadline." Ehlermann, 
The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 361, 404 (1987). 
